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ALTON R. MAYERS,

Petitioner and Relator,
vs.
M. J. BRONSON, one of the Judges
of the Third Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah, and the Third
Judicial District Court of the State
of Utah in and for Salt Lake County,

Case No.
6252

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

STATEMENT OF THE. CASE
Petitioner has in his brief made a statement of the
facts of this case. Defendants will attempt to avoid unnecessary repetition but will here make a statement of
the pertinent facts from which the questions herein arise.
Under date of January 8, 1940, the State Tax Commission issued a subpoena commanding Alton R. Mayers,
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one of the executors of the estate of Nellie R. Mayers,
deceased, and one of decedent's two heirs, to appear before the State Tax Commission and bring with him certain
books and records pertaining to a desig:t;1ated parcel of
real property located at 41-43 Broadway, Salt Lake City.
(Exhibit "A" attached to original Application for .Writ
of Prohibition.) Thereafter, on January 12, 1940, before
the return date of the. subpoena, counsel for Mr. Mayers
wrote and informed the Tax Commission that they had
advised their client not to respond to the subpoena. (See
Paragraph 4 of Exhibit "F".) After the return date for
the subpoena had gone by without the appearance of
Alton R. Mayers, the Tax Commission, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 104-45-15, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933, reported this fact to the District Court by
a sworn petition. (Exhibit '' B' '.) Upon the basis of this
petition, an order was issued out of the District Court
ordering Alton R. l\1ayers to appear and show cause why
he should not be held in contempt for failure to obey the
subpoena of the Tax Commission. (Exhibit "C".) In response to this order, petitioner appeared by counsel and
demurred to the petition and filed an Answer and Response to the petition. (See Exhibits "E" and "F".)
It is to be noted that the ground for the Demurrer was
that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It is further to be noted that the
gist of the :Itesponse and Answer of petitioner is pet~
tioner's claim that the Tax Commission had no authority
to issue the subpoena in question. Now here in either
pleading does the petitioner question the jurisdiction of
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the District Court and at no other time during any of the
proceedings in the District Court did petitioner raise
any question with regard to the jurisdiction of the District Court.
After a hearing on the issues so made, the District
Court, Honorable M. J. Bronson presiding, rendered its
decision on March 23, holding that the Tax Commission
had authority to issue the subpoena in question and that
refusal to obey the subpoena was a contempt under Section 104-45-15, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were drawn, served
upon counsel for petitioner, and filed with the. court.
Thereafter, these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law were signed by Judge Bronson on March 28, 1940.
No objection to any of the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law was filed by petitioner .. Thereafter, on
1\1:arch 29, 1940, Judge Bronson adjudged petitioner to
be guilty of contempt and ordered that he have until
April 8, 1940 to purge himself thereof by appearing before the Tax Commission; and further ordered that if be
did not so appear and purge himself he should appear on
that same date for sentence on the .adjudicated contempt.
By agreement this date was extended to May 8. Thereafter, counsel for Alton R. Mayers moved to set aside
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to
quash the order finding the petitioner to be in contempt.
This matter was argued to the District Court and both
motions were thereafter overruled.
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On May 7, 1940, petitioner filed with this Court his
Application for Writ of Prohibition on the basis of which
this Court, ex parte, issued its Alternative Writ of Prohibition.
In answer to this Alternative Writ of Prohibition,
defendants have filed a Demurrer and an Answer and
Response. In this brief, defendants will urge upon this
Court that prohibition is not a proper remedy and will
not lie on the facts of this case under the laws of Utah.
Inasmuch, however, as petitioner has mainly argued in
his brief the question of the power of the Tax Commission to issue the subpoena in question, defendants will
answer that argument and will demonstrate to this Court
that the Tax Commission has the subpoena power in
such a cas~ as this one. This latter argument with regard to the subpoena power of the Tax Commission is
made, however, without in any way waiving defendants'
position that prohibition is not .a proper remedy.
Defendants will present their position in the order
above indicated.

I.
PROHIBITION IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY
Defendants have demurred to and answered the
Application for Writ of Prohibition. By the Demurrer,
defendants have squarely put in issue the question of
whether prohibition is the proper remedy in this case.
It is submitted that prohibition is not ·a proper remedy.
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Prohibition Lies Only to Test Jurisdiction,
Not to Review Error.
It is unanilnously conceded by all authorities that
prohibition is an extraordinary legal remedy which is
to be used sparingly and which, likewise, is to be used
only in cases where the inferior tribunal against which
the writ is directed is acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in the particular matter, or has exceeded in
some point in the proceedings its jurisdiction. See 10469-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933; State ex rel. v.
Morse, 27 Utah 336, 75 Pac. 739; Board of Home Missions v. ll!faughan, 35 Utah 516, 101 Pac. 581; Harries v.
JJfcCrea, 62 Utah 348, 219 Pac. 533; Petition of U. S.,
263 U. S. 389, 68 L. Ed. 351; Sparkman Hardwood
Lumber Co. v. Bush, 189 Ark. 391, 72 S. W. (2d) 527;
People v,. Municipal Court, 359 Ill. 102, 194 N. E. 242;
State v. Tax Commission, 129 Ohio St. Rep. 83, 193 N. E.
751.
In Bankers Trust Co. v. District Court, 62 Utah 432,
220 Pac. 708, this Court refers to the writ of prohibition
as "the most extraordinary of all the writs" to be used
"with caution and forbearance". See also High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Third Edition, Chapter 21.
At Page 708, Section 764a of this authoritative work the
following quotation is found:
''The appropriate function of the remedy is
to restrain the exercise of unauthorized judicial
or quasi-judicial power, which is regarded as a
conten1pt of the state or sovereign, and which may
result in injury to the state or to its citizens. Three
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conditions are necessary to warrant the granting
of the relief: first, that the court, officer or person
. against whom it is sought is about to exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial power; second, that the
exercise of such power is unauthorized by law;
third, that it will result in injury for which no
other adequate remedy exists.''
Again at Pages 708-9 in Section 765 this same authority states:
''Being an extraordinary remedy, however,
it issues only in cases of extreme necessity, and
before it will be granted it must appear that the
party aggrieved has applied in vain to the inferior tribunal for relief. * * * And being a
prerogative writ, it is to be used, like all other
prerogative writs, with great caution and forbearance, for the furtherance of justice and to secure
order and regularity in judicial proceedings, when
none of the ordinary remedies provided by law
are applicable. Nor should it be granted except
in a clear case of want of jurisdiction in the court
whose action it is sought to prohibit. And to warrant the relief the petition must clearly show that
an inferior· court is about to proceed in a matter
over which it has no jurisdiction, and unless this
is distinctly and affirmatively shown the relief
will not be gran ted. ''
Again at Page 710, Section 766 of the same work, w.e
find this statement:
''Another distinguishing feature of the writ
is that it is a preventive rather than a corrective
remedy, and it issues only to prevent the comn1ission of a· future act, and not to undo an act
already performed.''
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Quoting further from this same authority at Pages
712 and 713, Section 767, the authority states:
"It follows from the extraordinary nature
of the re1nedy, as already considered, that the
exercise of the jurisdiction is limited to cases
where it is necessary to give a general superintendence and control over inferior tribunals, and
it is never allowed except in cases of a usurpation
or abuse of power, and not then unless other
existing remedies are inadequate to afford relief:
In other words, the remedy is employed only to
restrain courts from acting in excess of their
powers, and if their proceedings are within the
limits of their jurisdiction prohibition will not
lie. If, therefore, the inferior court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy, a
mistaken exercise of that jurisdiction or of its
acknowledged powers will not justify a resort to
the extraordinary remedy by prohibition.''
And at Pages 713-15, Sections 767a and 767b:
''In the exercise of the jurisdiction by prohibition it is important to distinguish between the
nature of the action which it is sought to prohibit,
and the sufficiency of the cause of action as stated
in the proceedings in the pending litigation. The
nature of the action itself determines the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter, regardless of the sufficiency of its presentation or
statement. If, therefore, the action is of such a
nature as to fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court, prohibition will not lie merely because of insufficiency in the staternent of the cause
of action in the pleadings, or because of insufficient proof to maintain the cause of action stated.
So the writ will not lie to stay the prosecution of
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an action by a city to condemn a right of way for
a sewer, because of the want of any averment or
proof that the city authorities have been unable
to agree with the defendant, or because the institution of the suit was not directed by the proper
authority. Questions of this nature do not go to
the j'urisdiction of the inferior court, but are
rather questions of law to be determined in the
action there pending, and the remedy for any
error in the action of the court upon such questions should be sought by appeal.
"Upon an application for a writ of prohibition to stay the action of an inferior court, the sole
question to be determined is the jurisdiction of
that court, and the court to which the application
is made will, for the purposes of the case, consider
the cause of action of the plaintiff below to be such
as he has stated in his pleadings, without investigation or inquiry touching the merits of the action. Nor will the court in which the relief is
sought consider any errors or irregularities occurring in the progress of the cause in the inferior
court, since the writ of prohibition is not an
appropriate remedy for the correction of errors.
The writ will not therefore be granted to prevent
an inferior court from proceeding with an action
because it has sustained a demurrer to a plea setting up the privilege of the defendants in the
action to be sued in another county, the court
in which the suit was brought having jurisdiction
of the subject-matter. Such a question being one
which arises in the progress of the cause of
which the court has jurisdiction, a writ of error
is the appropriate remedy to correct such action
of the court, if it be erroneous. And the writ will
not lie to determine .the title of a de facto judicial
officer, since its only function is to prevent a
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usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court,
and not to determine the title of the incumbent
of a judicial office. The title of respondent to the
office of judge will not, therefore, be determined
by a proceeding in prohibition to restrain him
from the hearing of a cause, since quo warranto
is the appropriate remedy for determining the
title to a public office.''
We have quoted and will subsequently quote at
length from High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies. The
quotations from this authority are more aptly phrased
and fit the case at bar better than any argument which
your defendants could present. From the above, it appears that prohibition is not to be used in every case
where a party feels himself to have been aggrieved by
a lower court decision; it is to be used only where the
lower court is acting either without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
Errors of law or fact in the findings or judgment
of the lower court cannot be tested by this writ. On this
proposition we refer the Court to Atwood v. Cox, 88
Utah 437, 55 Pac. (2d) 377; State ex rel. v. Morse, supra;
Board of Home Missions v. Maughan, supra; Dunn v.
Justice's Court, 136 Cal. App. 269, 28 Pac. (2d) 690;
Lindsey v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 37, 279 Pac.
837 and cases there cited. See also High's, supra, p. 720,
sec. 772.
vVe submit that there can be no question as to the
District Court's jurisdiction in this matter. In this connection, the Court i~ informed that after the Tax ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mission issued. its subpoena it received a letter from
counsel for the petitioner stating that on advice of
counsel petitioner would not comply with the subpoena.
Thereupon, and after the return date of the subpoena
went by without appearance of petitioner in conformance
therewith, the Tax Commission in accordance with the
statutory duties placed upon it by Section 104-45-15,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, reported that action to
the District Court. Section 104-45-15 provides in part
as follows:
''Whenever * * * any person duly subpoenaed
to appear and give evidence or to produce any
books or papers shall neglect or refuse to appear
or to produce such books or papers * * * he shall be
deemed in contempt, (of the officer issuing the
subpoena) and it shall be the duty of the person,
officer * * * board * * * to report the fact to the
judge of the district court of the county, * * *.''
(Italics and parenthetical insertion ours.)
Strictly in accordance with that statutory provision,
the Tax Commission reported the fact of the failure of
petitioner to comply with the subpoena to the District
Court of Salt Lake County.
Section 104-45-15 then further provides that upon
such report to the Judge he shall issue either a warrant
of attachment or order to show cause. Section 104-45-16
goes on to provide that when the person charged has
appeared, the same proceedings shall be had as in any
other contempt matter. Clearly, therefore, under these
statutory provisions contained in Chapter 45, Title 104,
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Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, the District Court is
given jurisdiction, and exclusive jurisdiction, to hear and
determine contempt proceedings in connection with subpoenas issued by other than judicial officers. When the
petitioner herein appeared in response to the order to .
show cause issued by Judge Bronson, petitioner demurred to the petition o£ the Tax Commission and also
answered and responded to the petition. Upon a hearing
duly had the Court found that the Tax Commission had
lawfully exercised the subpoena power in accordance
with its statutory duties and authority. A reading of
petitioner's brief submitted in this matter clearly demonstrates that petitioner's only complaint before this Court
is that Judge Bronson's ruling in this regard was erroneous. Petitioner at no time in any of the proceedings
before the District Court raised the question of the
jurisdiction. Neither does petitioner directly raise that
question here. That question is raised only inferentially
before this Court in connection with its application for
a writ of prohibition. It is not argued in petitioner's
brief. In other words, petitioner in the proceeding before
the District Court came into court without making objection to the jurisdiction of the District Court, proceeded
to a hearing on the merits and submitted the matter on its
merits, the sole issue being, was the Tax Commission
empowered to issue the subpoena in question. After an
adverse determination on the merits of this issue, petitioner now attempts to prohibit the action of the District
Court presumably as being beyond its jurisdiction. Obviously, petitioner ;never considered that the District
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Court was acting without jurisdiction in this matter but
now feels itself aggrieved by what it considers to be an
erroneous decision on the fundamental issue, namely,
the subpoena power of the Tax Commission. We submit
that petitioner cannot test the correctness of the lower
court's decision by this writ of prohibition. The only
question which petitioner is entitled to raise before this
Court on application for writ of prohibition is whether
or not the District Court had jurisdiction to hear the
controversy. That question, it is submitted, is conclusively determined against the petitioner by the statutory
provisions contained in Chapter 45, Title 104, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933.
In Crowther v. District Court, 93 Utah 586, 54 Pac.
(2d) 243, this Court had before it much the same question
as is presented by the case at bar. In that case, petitioners were the defendants in an action pending in the
District Court. The plaintiff in that. action caused a
notice to be served on petitioners' counsel that their
depositions were to be taken. Neither of the petitioners
appeared in response to that notice. The plaintiff in the
action then petitioned the District Court for an order
to ·petitioners to show cause why petitioners should not
be required to submit to examination and have their
depositions taken. The petitioners appeared in response
to this order to show cause and expressed their willingness to have their depositions taken but said that they
would not appear before the notary unless their statutory
witness and mileage fees were paid. The District Court
ruled that under the circumstances, witness and mileage
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fees need not be paid and ordered the petitioners to
appear and have their depositions taken. The order
setting the time and place for the depositions was served
upon the petitioners. Counsel for petitioners then advised them that they were not required to appear and
give testimony unless their witness and mileage fees were
paid. Depending upon this advice, petitioners again
failed to appear. Upon a showing made of these facts
before the District Court, the District Court issued a
citation directing petitioners to appear and show cause
why tliey should not be punished for contempt. Pursuant to that citation, the petitioners appeared and objected to the jurisdiction of the court and moved that
the citation be quashed. While this motion was under
advisement by the District Court, the petitioners obtained an alternative writ of prohibition from this Court
directed to .the District Judge. The Court recalled and
vacated the alternative writ of prohibition and denied
the petition for a permanent writ of prohibition. In
the course of its opinion, this Court stated the following
rules at pages 594-5 of 93 Utah:
''Petitioners do not contend that the court
below was without authority to issue the citation
requiring Messrs. Cro\vther and Jorgenson to
appear before the district court and show cause
why they should not appear and testify before a
notary public. That such a procedure is proper
was expressly held by this court in the case of
Woolley v. Wight, 65 Utah 619, 238 P. 1114, 41
A. L. R. 433. They did not appear pursuant to
the citation and after a hearing was had the
court directed that they appear before a notary
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public at a time and place fixed in the order. Their
claim that they were entitled to payment in advance of their witness and mileage fees was decided against them. We are not here concerned with
the question of whether the court was, or was not,
in error in concluding that they were not entitled
to their mileage and witness fees. In a proceeding
for a writ of prohibition we may not review matters involving mere error. Moreover, the mere
fact that the court may have been in error in
concluding that Messrs. Crowther and Jorgenson
were not entitled to witness fees did not justify
them in refusing to obey the order of February
28th.

'* * * Disobedience of an order made
by a court within its jurisdiction and
power is a contempt, although the order
may be clearly erroneous.' 13 C. J. 15.
''Numerous cases supporting the text just
quoted are collected in the footnote. Upon the
issuance of the citation and the hearing had on
the order to show cause why Messrs. Crowther
and Jorgenson should not appear and testify,
the court below had jurisdiction over their persons, and likewise had the power to determine
the controversy in that proceeding. The mere
fact that the court may have erred did not oust
it of jurisdiction. * * *" (Italics ours.)
We submit that this case clearly establishes the rule
in this state that error of the type herein alleged cannot
be reviewed upon a writ of prohibition. We further
maintain that the Crowther case, supra, is direct authority for the proposition contended for by defendants
herein, that prohibition is not a proper or available
remedy to petitioner.
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The san1e fundamental principles were announced
and recognized as the la"' by this Court in the case of
Atwood v. Cox, supra.

The Question of Jurisdiction Must Have Been Raised
in the Court Whose Proceedings It Is Sought to
Prohibit or Prohibition Will Not Issue from
the Superior Court.
As has been stated above, petitioner at no time in
the District Court in any manner raised any question
as to the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear and
determine the controversy. While it may be true as a
general proposition that the question of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the controversy may be raised at
any time, it is also a recognized principle that in connection with an application for a writ of prohibition
the petitioner, as a condition precedent to be entitled to
the writ, must have raised the question of jurisdiction
in the lower court. See High's Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, Page 722, Sections 773 and 773a.
This rule has been recognized by this Court and
announced as the law of this jurisdiction in the case
of Sammis v. Marks, 69 Utah 26, 252 Pac. 270, where
this court said at page 38 of 69 Utah:
"It is the general rule that prohibition will
not issue to arrest proceedings unless the attention of the court, whose proceedings are sought
to be arrested, was called to the alleged excess
of jurisdiction.''
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See also State v. Telford, 93 Utah 228 at 232-3, 72
Pac. (2d) 626.
This same rule, namely, that lack or excess of jurisdiction must be raised in the trial court whose proceedings are sought to be arrested before prohibition will
issue from a superior court, has been laid down in the
fallowing cases :

State ex rel. Scollard v. District Court, 47 Mont.
284, 132 Pac. 21;
State ex rel. Mays v. Breckenridge, 43 Okla. 711,
142 Pac. 407;
State ex rel. Poston v. District Court, 31 Wyo.
413, 227 Pac. 378;
State ex rel. McPherson Bros. Co. v. Superior
Court, 139 Wash. 294, 247 Pac. 3;
People v. Public Utilities Commission, 81 Colo.
361, 255 Pac. 608;
Baird v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. 408,268 Pac. 640;
Phillips v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 622, 293
Pac. 661;
Bank of America, etc., v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal.
App. (2d) 333, 86 Pac. (2d) 144.
See also Baughman v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. 572,
14 Pac. 207, 208, where the rule is stated as follows:
"It has been repeatedly held here that prohibition will not go from this court unless the
attention of the court, whose proceedings are
sought to be arrested, has been called to the al·Ieged excess of jurisdiction. Southern P.R. Co. v.
Superior Court, 59 Cal. 475. ''
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Therefore, having failed to attack in any way the
District Court's jurisdiction or even suggest lack or
excess of jurisdiction before the District Court, petitioner
is not entitled to the ''"'rit requested of this Court.

Prohibition Will Lie Only Where There Is No
Other Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary
Course of Law.
It is a further recognized principle universally applied that prohibition is granted, first, as stated above,
only to test jurisdiction but also, second, only in cases
where the usual and ordinary form of appellate remedy
provided by law does not provide adequate relief. See
High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, pages 716, etc.,
Sections 770, 771, 771a and 772. In Section 770, supra,
the rule is laid down in the following language:
''And it is a principle of universal application,
and one which lies at the very foundation of the
law of prohibition, that the jurisdiction is strictly
confined to cases where no other remedy exists,
and it is always a sufficient reason for withholding the writ that the party aggrieved has another
and complete remedy at law. The doctrine holds
good, even though the order of the court which
is sought to be stayed or prevented is erroneous."
(Italics ours.)
In Section 772, supra, the author states as follows:
''The proper function of a prohibition being to
check the usurpations of inferior tribunals, and
to confine them within the limits prescribed for
their operation by law, it does not lie to prevent
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a subordinate court from deciding erroneously,
or from. enforcing an erroneous judgment in a
case in which it has a right to adjudicate."
On the proposition that prohibition will not lie where
appeal after judgment will constitute an adequate
remedy, see also Bankers Trust Company v. District
Court, supra; August Belmont & Company v. Superior
Court, 117 Cal. App. 450, 4 Pac. (2d) 158; Holland v.
Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 523, 9 Pac. (2d) 531;
Plocher v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 337, 26 Pac.
(2d) 841; Struck v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. App. 672,
32 Pac. (2d) 1110; Fitts v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. (2d)
514, 51 Pac. (2d) 66, 102 A. L. R. 290 and annotation at 102
A. L. R. 298 et seq.
Applying these princi pies to the case at bar, there
is immediately disclosed an additional reason why prohibition is not the proper remedy. We have established
that the court below had jurisdiction of the matter in
controversy. It proceeded to a judgment in the form of
an order based upon findings of fact and conclusions of
hiw in which the court found that the Tax Commission
has the subpoena power, and that the subpoena had been
properly issued and served. The petitioner herein then
had available to him immediately a complete and adequate remedy in the ordinary course by appeal as provided by our laws. Appeal to this Court from the order
of the District Court would have enabled the petitioner
to properly raise before this Court the question of the
correctness in law and fact of the District Court's findings and ruling. In this connection attention is called
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
to Pages 2, 3 and 4 of petitioner's brief. There the petitioner discloses the whole theory of his complaint before
this Court. He states eight errors 'vhich he alleges the
court below made; but note that petitioner refers to
the court's action as erroneous and states:
"The following is a statement of the errors
upon which petitioner relies for a reversal of
the order of the defendant court. The court
erred:***.''
After the quoted statement petitioner states what
amounts to eight assignments of error. By this statement
petitioner has disclosed that in actuality and stripped of
all legal terminology he is asking this Court on a writ
of prohibition to reverse the decision of the trial court
on the question whether the Tax Commission has the
power to issue the subpoena herein. We submit that
since· petitioner is contending before this Court solely
that error was committed by the District Court, petitioner, by his own statements, demonstrates that he is
attempting to substitute this writ of prohibition for the
proper available remedy, namely, appeal to this Court
from the findings and order of the District Court.
See State ex rel. McPherson Brothers Company v.
Superior Court, supra, also on the proposition that prohibition will not lie after judgment has been rendered in
the court whose proceedings it is sought to prohibit.
Furthermore, petitioner would not have needed to
wait until sentenced by the District Court but could
have appealed from the order of the District Court adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judging him to be in contempt. That such an order was
a final judgment or appealable order has been indicated
by this Court in the case of In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315,
190 Pac. 952; see also Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381,
61 Pac. (2d) 1262; Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93
Utah 426, 73 Pac. (2d) 1277; North Point etc. Co. v.
Utah & S. L. Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 Pac. 824; Vol.
2, Am. Jur., pages 858, 860, 861 and 862.
Petitioner in his brief attempts to argue to this
Court that prohibition should here lie because appeal
would not serve as an adequate remedy. The only inadequacy disclosed or claimed by petitioner apparently
is that had he refused to appear before the Tax Commission and purge- himself, he would have been sentenced by the court on the contempt adjudication. Granting that to be true and granting for the sake of argument that he could not have appealed without being sentenced, we submit that none of the arguments advanced
by petitioner shows inadequacy of the remedy by appeal.
In the first place such a sentence by the court on the
finding of contempt would not, as plaintiff says, have
been a quasi-criminal conviction. This Court has clearly
and authoritatively recognized the difference between
civil and criminal contempt. See authorities cited infra.
Under the rule announced by this Court and under the
rule recognized by other courts this contempt was a civil
contempt only, and the finding of the petitioner in contempt in no way besmirched him with a criminal or quasicriminal conviction. Had he waited for sentence to appeal,
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the appeal "rould have immediately stayed execution of the
sentence, and pending determination by this Court, the
petitioner could have been in no way punished for the
conten1pt. Snu~th v. J(·imball, 76 Utah 350, 289 Pac. 588,
70 A. L. R. 101; High's, supra, P. 745, Sec. 789. We,
therefore, submit there is no exigency demonstrated in
this case nor any emergency which would justify this
Court under any so-called liberalized recognition of the
writ of prohibition in granting such writ where, as in
this case, the right of appeal in the regular and ordinary
manner would have fully and adequately protected petitioner's rights.
It is settled beyond question in this jurisdiction by
deci~ions of this Court that appeal will lie from a judgment finding a person in contempt. Herald-Republican
Publishing Company v. Lewis, 42 Utah 188, 129 Pac.
624; In re Thomas, supra; Bankers Trust Company v.
District Court, supra.
Even more specifically, this Court has, almost from
its inception, recognized a distinction between a '' criminal contempt" and a "civil contempt" and has held
that in the case of a civil contempt, appeal will lie from
a judgment of contempt. Snow v. Snow, 13 Utah 15, 43
Pac. 620; Ex Parte Whitmore, 9 Utah 441, 35 Pac. 524;
28 A. L. R. 50 et seq., especially at Page 56; see also
Rapalje on Contempt, Sec. 21, Pages 25-6. The distinction so recognized by our Court and substantiated by
practically all authorities on the subject is that a criminal contempt occurs where the act being punished as a
.•'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
contempt was an act in disrespect of a court's order; a
civil contempt, on the other hand, is a contempt where
the contemnor fails or refuses to do something which
he is ordered to do by the court and which is still in his
power to perform. Stated otherwise, criminal contempt
occurs by the commission of an act which is forbidden
and thereby the harm (either damage to another party
or the disrespect of the court) is irrevocably accomplished; whereas, a civil contempt occurs where the contemnor
is ordered to perform a certain act and refuses to do so
to the disadvantage of the party for whose advantage
the commission of the act is ordered. See also 12 Am.
,Tur., Page 392. Applying these principles to the case at
bar, it is readily seen that the contempt in this case is
a civil contempt and in no way even smacks of a criminal
or quasi-criminal proceeding.
In Snow v. Snow, supra, and Ex Parte Whitemore,
supra, this Court has laid down a rule which has never
. been questioned in our jurisdiction, and the rule is followed in practically all other jurisdictions, that appeal
will lie from a judgment finding a person to be guilty
of a civil contempt. These same cases also seem to lay
down the rule that appeal will not lie from a conviction
of criminal contempt. This may be an additional reason
why, in the cases cited by petitioner at Pages 6 to 9 of
his brief, prohibition was granted. In each of those
cases, except Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 Pac. (2d)
920, the contempt involved was a criminal contempt. In
Allen v. Lindbeck, the situation presented a ease where
the petitioner would have been besmirched with the
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stigma of a quasi-criminal conviction. Furthermore, in
Evans v. Evans, - - Utah - - , 98 Pac. (2d) 703, the
'vrit of prohibition was refused. It is also worthy of note
that in both the Allen v. Lindbeck and Evans v. Evans
cases, the parties agreed that this Court might consider
the cases on their merits and raised no question as to
whether prohibition was the proper remedy. Where the
parties to the action agree that a particular procedure
adopted may be considered as the proper procedure, a
court may be justified in not, of its own motion, raising
the question whether the procedure is proper. However,
where an attack is made on the procedure adopted, as
we here attack the resort to prohibition, we submit that
the court is not justified in assuming to decide questions
of error on any theory announced in any case where
parties to the litigation consented to the court's considering the merits of the case on a writ of prohibition.
From the above citation of authorities, there can
be no question but that the petitioner in this case had
a complete and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law by appeal to this Court from the judgment of the
District Court. In this same connection, we specifically
direct the court's attention to the fact that nowhere in
petitioner's brief does petitioner make one statement
with regard to any claim of lack of jurisdiction in the
District Court. Petitioner's sole and only defense of the
use of the writ of prohibition in this situation is a
nebulous anfi unsupported claim that there does not exist
an adequate remedy other than by prohibition. We submit that on this set of circumstances, this Court cannot
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do otherwise than dismiss the alternative writ of prohibition issued and refuse to issue any further writ of
prohibition. We submit further that we have conclusively
demonstrated that petitioner had available to him an
adequate remedy by appeal.
This Court has, by decision, also broadened the remedy of writ of certiorari to include not only a review of
the question of jurisdiction but also a review of error in
the court below. See Herald-Republican Publishing Company v. Lewis, supra, at Page 211 of 42 Utah; Olson v.
District Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 Pac. (2d) 529.
Therefore, with not only the remedy by appeal
available but also a remedy by certiorari, it would appear
doubly certain that petitioner in the case at bar has no
basis for attempting to proceed by prohibition.
In fact, we submit that, in the absence of such special
circumstances as will create an emergency of a type
certainly not pre sen ted here, this Court has held that
prohibition will not lie to review a judgment or proceeding in contempt. In Bankers Trust Company v. District
Court, supra, this Court laid down the following principles at Page 435:
''Plaintiff prays for a writ of prohibition,
prohibiting and enjoining defendants from issuing any commitment for contempt or from further
proceeding upon said order of July 10, 1923. An
alternative writ of prohibition was issued and
Rerved, whereupon the defendants filed a motion
to quash the alternative writ and to dismiss the
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proceedings, because the facts stated are insufficient to justify a \Yri t of prohibition or to constitute a cause of action.
''The motion must be sustained. It is very
doubtful ,,. .hether the case presents a question of
jurisdiction at all. Bd. of Home Missions v.
~Iaughan, 35 Utah, 516, 101 Pac. 581. It is not
denied that the district court has the legal power
to render a judgment against a garnishee, upon
regular service of a writ of garnishment and the
answer of the garnishee in a proper case. The
objection here is rather to the effect that the
district court erroneously construed the answer
as being sufficient to authorize the judgment and
erroneously declined to set the judgment aside.
But we pass that question, as the action must be
determined by a principle upon which we entertain no doubt. 'The writ of prohibition is a prerogative writ, the most extraordinary of all the
writs, and is ''to be used with caution and forbearance." ' Campbell v. Durand, 39 Utah 118,
115 Pac. 986. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 7408,
provides:
'It may be issued by the Supreme
Court, or by a district court or a judge
thereof, to an inferior tribunal, or to a
corporation, board, or person, in all cases
where there is not a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.'
''In garnishment proceedings, the garnishee
has a right of appeal from all final judgments or
orders the same as in other civil cases. Comp.
Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 6753. The order complained
of was made July 10, 1923. The application for
the writ of prohibition herein was filed October
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6, 1923, at which time the plaintiff had and still
has a clear right of appeal. This court has repeatedly held that the writ of prohibition will not lie
for grievances which n1ay be redressed in the
ordinary course of law by appeal."
This Court then quashed the alternative writ of
prohibition and dismissed the prohibition proceedings.
We submit that the principles announced in that case
govern the case at bar and that the alternative writ
issued out of this Court should be dismissed.
The correct and proper procedural use of the writ
of prohibition is strikingly illustrated by the case of
Jones v. Cox, 84 Utah 568, 37 Pac . (2d) 777- ''strikingly illustrated", we say, because there the petitioner
objected in the very first stages of the proceedings to
the jurisdiction of the court; when the court overruled
his objection, petitioner immediately sued out his writ
to prevent any further proceedings; and the writ was
directed to the agency initiating the proceedings, namely,
the court. In the case at bar, on the other hand, petitioner made no jurisdictional objection in the court below ; he waited until the court decided against him on
the merits; he allowed the court to proceed to consider
and determine the merits without jurisdictional objection; and he is not attempting to prohibit the only
agency which he at any time alleges or claims has acted
without jurisdiction-the Tax Commission-but he is
attempting to prohibit the District Court against whom
his only complaint is that it committed error in its determination on the merits.
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In Woolley v. lVight, 65 Utah 619, 238 Pac. 1114,
this Court held that "There an affidavit reported to the
District Court the fact of a person's having refused to
appear before a notary public and have his deposition
taken after notice according to statute, the District
Court to whom such report is made not only has jurisdiction but is duty bound to order such person to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt for.
such refusal and a writ of mandamus was issued by
this Court to compel the District Court to issue such
order to show cause and proceed to hear the contempt
matter. Prohibition in our State is by statute declared to
be the counterpart of mandamus. See 104-69-1, R. S. U.
1933. We submit that it is impossible to say in one breath
that a District Court may be forced by mandamus to hear
a contempt proceeding and yet in the same type of case
(contempt of a non-judicial officer under Sec. 104-45-15,
R. S. U., 1933) could be prohibited as not having jurisdiction to hear and determine such a case.
Petitioner is asking this Court, as evidenced by the
last statement in his brief, to reverse the judgment of
the lower court. It is fundamental that prohibition will
not lie to prevent the doing of something already done;
it will not lie to require the person to whom it is addressed to do some act. Brooks v. Warren, 5 Utah 89,
12 Pac. 659. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it certainly will not lie to reverse action already taken by a
District Court. Appeal is the method provided by our
system of jurisprudence to achieve that result. See also
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1-ligh 's, supra, Page 724, Sec. 77 4; State ex rel. v. Superior Court, 139 Wash. 294, 247 Pac. 3. Prohibition may
be used only to arrest proceedings before termination.

Petitioner Is Attempting to Prohibit
the Wrong Agency
In further support of our position that prohibition
IS not a proper remedy, we call the Court's attention
to the fact that petitioner, in this case, plainly is attempting to prohibit the wrong agency. As demonstrated
above, the District Court has jurisdiction to hear contempt matters. The contempt is based upon the subpoena
issued by the Tax Commission. The District Court, thus,
comes into the picture only as the adjudicator on the
question of whether the action of the petitioner constituted a contempt. The instigator of the proceeding
was the Tax Commission. It was that Commission which
issued the subpoena, and if any one under any theory
was acting beyond its jurisdiction, it was the Tax Commission and not the District Court.
Granting, solely for the sake of argument, that the
Tax Commission was without power to issue the subpoena in question, then we submit that the Tax Commission was the agency acting beyond its jurisdiction
and not the District Court. Under that assumption, the
District Court has erroneously found that the Tax Commission had the subpoena power, but such finding is
merely error within its jurisdiction and not a lack of
jurisdiction to make the finding.
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\\TI!en the subpoena 'vas served upon Alton R. Mayers, counsel for the petitioner, as den1onstrated by Paragraph-! of Exhibit F, attached to petitioner's application
for "~rit of prohibition, notified the Tax Commission that
petitioner would not respond to the subpoena because
counsel considered the Tax Commission to be without
authority to issue that subpoena. We submit that immediately upon having the subpoena served upon him~
petitioner 'vas in a position to test the Tax Commission's
power to issue that subpoena by securing an alternative
writ of prohibition against the Tax Commission. By proceeding in that manner, petitioner probably could have
raised the question he is here attempting to raise, namely,
the Tax Commission's power to issue the subpoena. But,
assuming that petitioner had availed himself of what
we submit would have been the only proper use of the
writ of prohibition by securing sucH alternative writ
against the Tax Commission, and had the Court found,
as the Court did find in this proceeding, that the Tax
Commission had the power to issue the subpoena, then
we submit that certainly there would be no question as
to the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear a petition of the Tax Commission directed to enforcing its
subpoena by a contempt citation as done here. This
further demonstrates that there was no lack of jurisdiction in the District Court to hear this rna tter.
In this same connection let us refer to the cases
cited by petitioner at Pages 6 to 9, inclusive, of his brief.
In ev~ry one of the cases cited by petitioner in support
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of his proposition that prohibition is the proper remedy,
the prohibition was directed to the agency or person
initiating the proceeding. In State v. Circuit Court, 97
Wis. 1, 72 N. W. 193, the writ of prohibition was directed
to the District Judge. He, upon his own motion and
findings, had adjudicated the petitioner there to be in
contempt.
In Smith v. Kimball, supra, the writ of prohibition
was directed to the Judge who had attempted to find
the petitioner in contempt for failure to abide by the
judgment of that court when that judgment had been
appealed and was pending on appeal.
In Dickey v. Brokaw, 53 Ohio App. 141, 4 N. E. (2d)
411, the petitioner secured the writ of prohibition against
the notary public issuing the subpoena, not against any
District Court. In other words, in the Dickey v. Brokaw
case petitioner had done what we say petitioner must
have done here in order to properly avail himself of the
writ of prohibition, namely, direct the writ to the person
or agency issuing the subpoena and not wait until the
matter was presented to the District Court for adjudication and then attempt to prohibit the District Court.
In Allen v. Lindbeck, supra, the writ was directed to
the justice of the peace who had issued the warrant.
In the case of Evans v.~ Evans, supra, the writ of
prohibition was not made permanent, but in any event
it was directed to the District Judge who had ordered the
petitioner to produce certain books and records.
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As stated, in every one of these cases, cited by petitioner, the writ of prohibition was directed to the agency
or person initiating the matter by issuing the subpoena,
the warrant, or on his own motion finding a person in
contempt. All of these cases, it is submitted, support
only the proposition that a writ of prohibition in this
case might lie against the Tax Commission. None of
them supports the issuance of a writ of prohibition
against the District Court hearing a contempt under
104-45-15, R. S. U., 1933.
Summary

To follow petitioner's argument to its logical conclusion and to succinctly state the entire gist of petitioner's argument and the conclusion to be arrived at,
the result would be as follows:
Since the Tax Commission has no jurisdiction or
power to issue the subpoena in question, the District
Court is without jurisdiction to hear or determine the
question of the power of the Tax Commission to issue
the subpoena in question. We submit that, stripped of
all unnecessary verbiage, the above is a fair, compact
statement of the position which petitioner must take in
order to sustain his claim that prohibition is a proper
remedy. We further submit that the mere statement of
the proposition serves to demonstrate its fundamental
error.
Furthermore, to follow the position which plaintiff
must take in order to sustain its use of the remedy
of prohibition-namely, that the District Court lacked
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jurisdiction or acted in excess of jurisdiction-we reach
this anomalous result: The question of the Tax Commission's power to issue a subpoena in such a case as this
could never be tested because if the District Court is
without jurisdiction to hear the matter, then the question of the Commission's power could never be judicially
determined unless the petitioner were to attempt to prohibit the Commission itself from issuing a subpoena or
proceeding further on a subpoena issued. The Tax Commission would be powerless to compel any individual to
bring prohibition against it to test its power and thus,
to follow the plaintiff's position again to its logical conclusion, there never could be a determination of the question.
The statement of the result of plaintiff's position in
this case serves to illustrate further the soundness of
the position here taken by the defendants, that the defendants have complete and plenary jurisdiction to hear
and determine the question of the power of the Tax Commission to issue the subpoena. If defendants have erroneously decided that question in favor of the Tax
Commission, the correctness of defendants' ruling should
be, as in all other cases under our system of jurisprudence, tested in the orderly, regular fashion by
appeal to this Court asking this Court to review the
judgment of the District Court and to reverse the same
if error be found.
To summarize briefly, we submit that upon each of
the following grounds considered alone and certainly
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upon the basis of all of them combined, defendants have
conclusively shown that prohibition is not a proper remedy in the case at bar:
1. Petitioner makes no claim that there was any
lack, or action in excess, of jurisdiction in the District
Court. Prohibition will lie only in cases where the court
against "'"hom the writ is directed is acting in excess of
or without jurisdiction.
2. Defendants have clearly demonstrated that the
District Court had jurisdiction to hear and. determine
the controversy in question. Petitioner's only grievance
before this Court is a claim that the District Court committed error in its finding of power in the Tax Commission to issue the subpoena in question. Prohibition
will not lie to review or correct error in the action of
the court below.
3. Prohibition will not lie if any other adequate
remedy is available to petitioner in the ordinary course
of law. Both appeal and certiorari were open to the
petitioner and either would have constituted a completely adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
5. Prohibition will not lie to prevent the doing of
something already done. Petitioner is here specifically
asking this Court for relief in only one form-reversal
of the action already taken by the District Court. Prohibition will not lie to reverse action already taken.
6. In any event, petitioner has misconceived the
purpose of the writ by failing to direct it to the agency
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against which prohibition might be a proper remedy.
Under petitioner's own theory of the case, the Tax Commission is the only agency against which the petitioner
makes any claim to have acted beyond its jurisdiction.
If prohibition is a proper remedy in this situation at all,
it would be proper only when ·directed to the Tax Commission. Therefore, having attempted to prohibit the
wrong agency, prohibition will not lie in this case.
It is, therefore, our position that not only has
petitioner failed to recite any authority in support of
his position that prohibition is the proper remedy, but
that the authorities cited by the petitioner, on the contrary, support the view urged by defendants, that prohibition is not the proper remedy when directed to the
District Court in this situation. We, therefore, strongly
urge upon this Court that prohibition is not the proper
remedy, that defendants' demurrer should be sustained,
the alternative writ dismissed and that this Honorable
Court refuse to issue the pexmanent writ of prohibition.

II.
THE TAX COMMISSION HAS THE POWER TO
ISSUE THE SUBPOENA IN QUESTION
Because substantially all of petitioner's brief is
directed to the proposition that the Tax Commission was
without authority to issue the subpoena in question and
solely for that reason and without in any way waiving
the position heretofore urged, the defendants will here
demonstrate that the Tax Commission was empowered
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to issue the subpoena in question. By making this argument 've do not concede that the question of the Tax
Commission's subpoena power is properly before this
Court but on the contrary urge that the question is not
properly before this Court and should not be considered
in the decision rendered by this Court.

The Tax Commission Has the Subpoena Power
by Direct Grant
Petitioner in his brief. has, we submit, set up a
straw man for the purpose of knocking it down and thus
making what appears to be an argument before this
Court. The straw man is that the Tax Commission
claims the subpoena power by implication. Such is not
the fact. The Tax Commission has at all times taken
the position that the subpoena which it issued to petitioner in this case was issued by reason of a direct
grant of subpoena power.
The Tax Commission was created by amendment
to the Constitution of our State which became effective
November 4, 1930. Among other things, this Constitutional amendment provides that the TaX! Commission
'' * * * shall administer and supervise the tax laws of
the State* * *" and "* * *shall* * *have such other
powers as may be prescribed by the I_Jegislature," Article XIII, Sec. 11, Constitution of Utah. Pursuant to
this amendment, the Legislature of 1931 clothed this
constitutionally created body and gave it life. Chapter
53, Laws of Utah, 1931. Section 5983 of that chapter
designated the number of commissioners, the terms of
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office, etc. Section 5984 outlined the powers and duties
of the Tax Commission in substantially the same form
as they now appear in Section 80-5-46, Revised Statutes,
of Utah, 1933. Having been constitutionally charged
with the duty of administering and supervising the tax
laws of Utah, any power granted to the Commission by
the Legislature which is not specifically limited to one
particular type of tax must be construed as being in
furtherance of the Commission's constitutional duty to
administer and supervise all taxes. Not only is the subpoena power not limited to any one particular tax, but
in specific language is granted to the Tax Commission
in connection with any matter which the Tax Commission
"shall have authority to investigate or determine".
Every power granted by the Legislature to the Commission in furtherance of the Commission's constitutional duties must be held to apply to all tax laws unless
specifically limited otherwise.
It is to be noted further that this same Legislature,
namely, the Legislature of 1931 passed the first Corporation Franchise Tax Act and the first Individual Income
Tax Act. Substantially the same provisions of these
two tax acts were reenacted into Chapters 13 and 14
of Title 80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. We call
attention to this legislative history because petitioner
has attempted to make a point in his brief of the fact
that provisions of the Corporation Franchise Tax and
the Individual Income Tax Acts specifically provide for
the subpoena of witnesses (Sections 80-13-53 and 80-1456, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933) but that no such
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specific provision is found in the Inheritance Tax Act.
First, it may "~ell be argued that the sections referred to
in the Corporation Franchise Tax and Individual Income
Tax Acts do not specifically or directly provide for the
issuance of subpoenas. They merely provide that agents
of the Commission shall have the power to examine books
and records pertaining to matters required to be included
in the taxpayer's returns under those acts and to require
the attendance of any person having knowledge of such
matters and to take testimony. Nowhere in either of
those acts do we find the subpoena power specifically
given. Second, we submit that the reason for those two
provisions appearing in the Individual Income Tax and
the Corporation Franchise. Tax Acts is apparent from
the fact that these taxes were enacted by the same
Legislature which gave the Tax Commission the general power of subpoena. (See Section 80-5-46 (16), Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.) The granting in those
two particular tax acts of a power which might imply
the subpoena power was only an evidence of an overabundance of caution on the part of the Legislature,
induced further by the fact that there was at that time
no general law applying to all tax acts coming under the
jurisdiction of the Tax Commission which would give
the power to the Tax Commission to subpoena witnesses
and books and records with reference to taxes which it
administers.
Because the Corporation Franchise and Individual
Income· Tax Acts were enacted by the same Legislature
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which gave the Con1mission subpoena power, the Legislature could not have been certain when the Corporation
Franchise and Individual Income Tax Acts were drafted
that the general subpoena power section in Section 5984
of Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1931 would pass in that
form. Therefore, not being certain of the existence in
a general law of the Commission's subpoena power, the
Legislature added the sections referred to by petitioner
to the Individual Income and Corporation Franchise
Tax Acts in order to insure that the Tax Commission
would have the subpoena power in connection with taxes
coming under its supervision. However, it is also to be
noted that in every revenue measure enacted since 1931
or given to the Tax Commission to administer subsequent
to 1931, the specific grant of subpoena power is conspicuous by its absence-obviously because, the general
power of subpoena then being on the statute books, the
Legislature considered that general power as applying
to all taxes given to the Tax Commission to administer
subsequent to 1931.
We also call the court's attention to the fact that
out of the great number of tax acts which the Tax Commission must administer, only the Corporation and Individual Income Tax Acts have any such provisions as
referred to by petitioner. The Sales Tax Act has no
such provision. The Use Tax Act has no such provision.
The Motor Vehicle Registration Act has no such provision. The Cigarette and Oleomargarine Tax Act has no
such provision. The Motor Fuels Tax Act has no such
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provision, and as petitioner has stated, the Inheritance
Tax .£..:\..et has no such provision. But each and every one
of these taxes "\Yere given to the Tax Commission to administer subsequent to the creation of the Tax Commission and subsequent to the Legislature of 1931.
As stated above, the sections referred to in the Corporation Franchise and Individual Income Tax Acts
may well be said not to specifically and directly give the
Tax Commission the subpoena power in connection with
those acts were it not for the existence of the general
power of subpoena in Section 80-5-46 (16), Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Petitioner has argued in his brief
that the subpoena power cannot be said to exist by mere
implication. Assuming without admitting that petitioner
is correct in this statement, then we submit that the Tax
Commission might very well be said not to have the
subpoena power in connection with either individual income or corporation franchise tax were it not for the
existence of Section 80-5-46 ( 16). A study of these tax
acts and particularly the sections to which petitioner
refers discloses that nowhere is the word ''subpoena''
used. Those sections read alone would give the subpoena
power only by implication and inference.
It is only by reason of the provisions of Section
80-5-46 (16) that the Tax Commission has the subpoena
power in connection with any tax act and it is by reason
of this section that the Tax Commission has taken the
position that it has the subpoena power in this case. That
~ection reads as follows:
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"To examine all records, books, papers and
documents relating to the valuation of property
of any corporation or individual, and to subpoena
witnesses to appear and give testimony and to
produce records, books, papers and documents
relating to any matter which the tax commission
shall have authority to investigate or determine.
The tax commission or any party may in any
investigation cause depositions of witnesses to be
taken as in civil actions. Any member of the state
tax commission, its secretary, cashier, and such
other officers or employees as the commission
may designate, may administer oaths and affirmations in any matter or proceeding relating to
the exercise of the powers and duties of the tax
commission. ' ' (Italics ours.)
We call attention to the clear and unambiguous
language of this section giving the subpoena power to
the Tax Commission in relation "to any matter which
the Tax Commission shall have authority to investigate
or determine." It does not limit this power of the Commission to matters which the Tax Commission shall have
the power to investigate and determine, but gives the
Commission that power in either instance. Thus, the
Legislature demonstrated that when this provision of
law was enacted, it contemplated that there might be
situations then existent or coming into existence in the
future in connection with which the Tax Commission
would have only investigatory powers and not determinatory powers. The Legislature also demonstrated
that it intended to give the Tax Commission the subpoena power in connection with matters which it should
only hav(} the power to inve~tigate but not determine.
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\V·e further present to this Court that the Tax Commission \Yas created for several very definite and logical
reasons. Alnong them \Yas the desire of the people of
this State as evidenced by the Constitutional Amendment, to have the administration of all tax acts and all
revenue measures placed under the supervision and
control of one central agency which agency would then
be held responsible for the administration and supervision of all revenue laws. Second, the Legislature undoubtedly conceived that by giving to this central agency
a subpoena power in connection with all matters coming
under its jurisdiction- either investigatory or determinatory jurisdiction- more efficient administration
could and would be had.
With these principles in mind, let us now consider
the powers of the Tax Commission in relation to inheritance tax.
The administration of the inheritance tax was not
placed in the Tax Commission until the effective date
of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, namely, June 26,
1933. Prior to that time the Attorney General's office
was charged with some of the duties of administering
that tax. In 1933 the Tax Commission was made the ex
officio collector of inheritance taxes and was charged
with the duty of representing the state "in all matters
pertaining to the collection of such taxes''. (Section
80-12-27, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.) Section 8012-37 then provides :

''Any person having knowledge of property
liable to such tax, against which no proceeding
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for enforcing collection thereof is pending, shall
report the same to the state tax commission, and
it shall be its duty to investigate the case, and
if it has reason to believe the information to be
true, it shall forthwith institute proceedings for
the collection of the same.''
By the express language of this latter section, the
Tax Commission is under the solemn duty imposed upon
it by the Legislature to investigate the facts concerning
any property which is reported to the Commission as
possibly being subject to inheritance tax. The Legislature certainly must have contemplated that this investigation would be more than a superficial examination of
probate records. This is illustrated by the fact that the
Tax Commission's investigation of such cases is limited
to property ''against which no proceeding for enforcing
collection thereof is pending.'' The Legislature there
demonstrated that it contemplated that certain transfers
of property or the holding of property in certain ways
would never be disclosed in the ordinary probate proceeding or in the ordinary proceeding to compute inheritance tax.
For example, let us suppose that in a particular case
part of the property of a decedent was transferred in
such a manner as to come within the terms of a transfer
"in contemplation of death". The remainder of such
decedent's property would, let us suppose, be probated.
An examination of the probate records in such a case
would, of course, disclose no information with regard to
the property w:Q.ich had been transferred in contempla-
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tion of death. Let us further suppose that such a decedent also held certain property in joint tenancy with
full right of snrYivorship. The probate records again
would disclose nothing 'vith regard to such property.
Let us further suppose that such decedent had transferred property in a manner to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death. Such a transfer would
not be disclosed by anything appearing in the probate
records. In each of these cases, however, the property
would be subject to inheritance tax. The Tax Commission, upon learning of the existence of such property
or of such transfer having been made, is, by the terms
of Section 80-12-37, charged with the duty of investigating the case and if, after such investigation, it has
reason to believe that the property is subject to tax, it
is enjoined to forthwith institute proceedings for the
collection of the tax. The Legislature certainly cannot be
presumed to have intended this type of an investigation
to be still-born. It must be presumed to have intended
that the Tax Commission would make a searching and
complete investigation from whatever sources might be
available. The Tax Commission was meant to learn
enough to substantiate proceedings to collect the tax
due.
Petitioner also attempts to make some point of the
fact that this investigatory duty was, prior to 1933,
vested in the county clerks of the various counties.
This, of course, is true but the conclusions drawn by
the petitioner from this fact are completely and entirely
non sequiturs. From this fact the petitioner concludes
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that since the county clerks had no subpoena power,
the Tax Commission cannot be said to have subpoena
power. That such a conclusion obviously does not follow
appears from the fact that the county clerks nowhere
at any time had any general grant of subpoena power
in connection with matters of which they were charged
with the investigation. The Tax Commission does have
such a general grant of subpoena power. Furthermore,
it may be presumed that one of the reasons why the
administration of the Inheritance Tax Act was vested
in the Tax Commission is that by reason of the broader
powers of the Tax Commission it would thereby be enabled to more efficiently conduct such investigations.
The Legislature certainly knew of the general subpoena
power which it had lodged in the Tax Commission when in
1933 it gave the Tax Commission the further duty of
administering and supervising the Inheritance Tax Law.
Knowing of this general power vested in the Tax Commission, the Legislature must have intended that the
Tax Commission would put teeth into this investigatory
power and make an actual and bona fide investigation
into the true facts surrounding the inheritance tax liability of any particular piece of property. The very
fact that the investigatory power was taken from the
clerks of the district courts and given to the Tax Commission further demonstrates that the Legislature fully
intended that the Tax Commission should use its subpoena power in conducting such investigations and not
merely make a superficial examination of probate records resulting in an abortive investigation. Otherwise,
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the Legislature could have left this duty of investigation
in the hands of the district court clerks to be done at
the request of the Tax Commission. Prior to 1933,
while the Attorney General was the ex officio collector
of inheritance taxes, the Attorney General did not have
this investigatory duty but the district court clerks
had it. There "\vas nothing, therefore, to prevent the
Legislature from, had it so intended, making the Tax
Commission merely, the ex officio collector and leaving
the investigatory duty in the county clerks under the
Commission's supervision. The Legislature, however,
did not see fit to do this but, rather, placed this duty
of investigation in the Tax Commission with full knowledge that there existed in the statutes previously enacted the power in the Commission to issue subpoenas
and require the production of books and records in connection 'vith any matter which the Commission had the
duty to investigate.
Before leaving this phase of our argument we desire to state that at no time has the Tax Commission
claimed the power to set or determine the amount of
inheritance taxes. The Tax Commission has freely conceded that power to be in the district courts. However,
the Tax Commission has taken the position which, it is
submitted, is fully justified that it is more than a mere
clerical agency to record the collection of inheritance
taxes. It is a body constitutionally charged with the
duty of representing the interests of the State of Utah
in connection with inheritance taxes and with ascertaining whether all property which should be included in
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the computation of inheritance tax is included. If any
property which the Tax Commission believes to be subject to inheritance tax is not included in the computation, the Commission conceives its constitutional and
statutory duty to be to report that to the district court
together with the facts of the situation and there represent
the state in contending that such property should be included in the inheritance computation.
With these duties in mind, it is difficult to conceive how the Legislature could have expected the Tax
Commission to in any manner even begin to carry out
these duties without giving it the power to ascertain the
facts surrounding particular parcels of property or particular transfers of property. The Commission could
not appear before a district court with a petition setting
forth a mere suspicion that a certain parcel of property
had been transferred in such a manner as to be subject
to inheritance taL It must be able to appear before
the district court with a petition setting forth sufficient
fact~ to constitute a cause of action, namely, to show that
if those facts actually exist and can be proved certain
property is subject to inheritance tax. In most instances
where property is not voluntarily included in an inheritance tax computation those facts which the Tax Commission must present to the court are necessarily within
the knowledge of persons in privity with the decedent.
The only way the Commission can discover those facts
and be able to present them to the court is by issuing
a subpoena to persons who will not voluntarily· disclose
the facts.
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After the facts are secured, \ve submit that the Tax
Commission has the further power and duty to determine for itself in the first instance \vhether it feels there
is sufficient cause to call the court's attention to these
facts and have a determination of tax liability. If the
Tax Commission, after disclosure to it of all facts, considers that the property or the transfer of property is
not subject to inheritance tax, then the Commission is
not bound to have any proceeding in the district court.
If, however, the Commission has good cause to believe
that the facts indicate taxable property or transfers
which are taxable, it must report these facts to the district court in a petition and there advocate the state's
cause in attempting to secure an adjudication of additional inheritance tax.
It is, therefore, our contention that by the express
provisions of Section 80-5-46 (16) the Tax Commission
is given the subpoena power in connection with any
matter which it shall be its duty to investigate. By the
express provisions of Section 80-12-37, the Commission
is charged with the duty of investigating whether certain property may be. subject to inheritance tax. Therefore, it is inescapable that the Tax Commission has the
subpoena power in connection with that investigation.
It is a universally recognized principle of statutory
construction that a general statutory provision, which
by its terms is prospective in character, will be applied
to any subsequent case or subsequent statutory provision
coming within the terms of that general prospective la\v.
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The general powers given in Section 80-5-46 are prospective in character. This will be demonstrated by a
mere reading of the provisions contained in Section
80-5-46. For example, the first power and duty there
given is that the Tax Commission may sue and be sued
in its own name. Obviously, this power must be said to
apply to all of the taxes the administration of which were
added to the Tax Commission's duties' subsequent to
1931. See also Subsections (2), (14), (15), (16), (18),
(19), (20), (21), (22), (23) and (24) of Section 80-5-46.
Particular attention is directed to Subsection (23) which
gives to the Tax Commission the power and duty ''to
perform such further duties as may be imposed upon
it by law, and exercise all powers necessary in the performance of its duties.'' This latter section in express
language illustrates that the powers therein granted were
intended to apply to all taxes which might in the future
be added to those already existent.
The Tax Commission was given the general power
referred to prior to the time the administration of the
Inheritance Tax Law was placed under the Tax Commission's jurisdiction. These general powers being prospective in character, the general grants of powers therein
contained are applicable to the Inheritance Tax Law.
See 25 R. C. L. 778, Sec. 24; 59 C. J. 1105, Section 655.
In Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section
341, Page 427, this rule is laid down in clear and unambiguous language as follows:
''Whenever a power is given by statute,
everything necessary· to n1ake it effectual or re~
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quisite to attain the end is implied. It is a well
established principle that statutes containing
grants of power are to be construed so as to include the authority to do all things necessary to
accomplish the object of the grant. The grant of
an express po,ver carries with it by necessary
implication every other power necessary and proper to the execution of the power expressly
granted. Where the law commands anything to
be done it authorizes the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its commands. vVhen a justice of the peace is required
to issue a warrant for the collection of costs made
on a hearing before him, it is implied that he has
power to decide on the amount. vVhen an existing jurisdiction is enlarged so as to include new
cases, it is not necessary to declare that the old
provisions shall apply to the new cases. If for
example, the jurisdiction of justices of the peace
should be extended to actions of slander, the existing provisions for a review by certiorari and
appeal would apply to cases coming under the
en1arged as well as arising under the former
jurisdiction of the court. It is an established
rule that where an action founded upon one statute is given by a subsequent statute in a new case,
everything annexed to the action by the first
statute is likewise given. Th~ power to grant
temporary alimony is incidental to the divorce
jurisdiction. If an act. merely directs a particular
measure to be taken, it must be understood as
referring its execution to the proper existing
agents, and to annex, by implication, all the ordinary means for carrying the measure into effect. Where an inferior court is empowered to
grant an injunction, it has power to enforce its
observance by punishing disobedience; such
power being essential to afford relief by injuncSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50
tion. A statute authorizing a magistrate to examine such witnesses as might be brought before
him authorizes him to issue subpoenas for them,
and to compel their attendance by the usual process of the court. ' '
See also Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, 2nd Edition, Sections 503, 504 and 508.
This principle was laid down as early as 1842 by
the Supreme Court of the State of New York. In its
opinion in the case of People v. Commissioners of the
Canal Fund, 3 Hill's Reports 599, apparently certain
claims for damages were statutorily provided for and
an appeal from the decision of the canal appraisers was
also provided for. A subsequent statute enlarged the
jurisdiction of the canal appraisers to include the power
to pass upon a certain classification of claims not originally placed within their jurisdiction. The argument was
made that inasmuch as the subsequent statute contained
no provision· for appeal from the decision of the canal
appraisers, no appeal remedy existed. The court held
otherwise and stated the rule to be as follows: "When an
existing jurisdiction is enlarged so as to include new
cases, it is not necessary to declare that the old provisions shall apply to the new cases. If, for example,
the jurisdiction of justices of the peace should be extended to actions of slander, the existing provisions for
a review by certiorari and appeal would apply to cases
coming under the enlarged as well as arising under the
former jurisdiction of the court.'' In other words, the
New York Supreme Court held that whenever new duties
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or powers are granted to an existing board or tribunal,
the general powers previously granted to such board
will apply to the ne'Y subject matter unless. specifically
directed otherwise.
This same rule 'vas also stated by the Court of
Appeals of Louisiana in the case of Giangrosso v. Straub,
122 So. 915, where the court states at Page 916:
' ' The action of the sheriff in refusing to sell
the property is the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint. His refusal is justified, it is claimed, by
article 684 of the Code of Practice, which reads
as follows:
'Consequently, if the price offered in
this case by the highest and last bidder,
is not sufficient to discharge the privileges
and mortgages existing on the property,
and which have a preference over the judgment creditor, there shall be no adjudication, and the sheriff shall proceed to seize
other property of the debtor, if there be
any.'
"In answer to this contention, plaintiff's
counsel argues that this article of the Code, having been adopted long before the introduction of
chattel mortgages in this state, can have no application. This argument is not sound, for the reasons that the Legislature must be presumed to
have been familiar with the provisions of the Code
relative to mortgages, when it sanctioned and
adopted the chattel mortgage. All laws establishing a general practice are applicable to new statutes when pertinent, no matter what difference
there may b~ in the time of their enactment. State
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v. Judge of Second District Court, 5 La. Ann.
518; Waldo v. Bell, 13 La. Ann. 329; Clavarie v.
Waggaman, 1 McGloin, 35."
In addition to establishing the rule that general
powers already existent, which are prospective in character, will be held to extend to duties and powers and
jurisdiction subsequently granted to the same board or
tribunal, the above citations to general authority on
statutory construction also clearly establish that all
powers necessary to carry out the duties and powers
specifically granted wl.ll be implied. The State Tax
Commission having been charged with the duty of collecting inheritance taxes and further with the duty of
investigating the taxability of property or transfers
upon which no proceeding is pending in court, it must
be implied that the Tax Commission has the power to
enforce these specific duties. Otherwise, the giving of
the duty to investigate and to collect taxes under the
Inheritance Tax Law would be a mere nullity and the
Commission would be in the position of having to accept
the returns and statements of the executor without any
independent investigation.
The property located at 41-43 Broadway has not
been inventoried for inheritance tax purposes. The Tax
Commission has been informed by counsel for the petitioners that it will not be inventoried for inheritance
tax purposes in the estate of Nellie R. Mayers, deceased.
That being true, the only remedy of the Tax Commission
is to petition the court for an order that such property
be inventoried and appraised. Before such order of
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the court vvill issue, the Tnx Com1nission must plead
and carry the burden of proving the facts to show that
this property should be included in the gross estate of
Nellie R. ~layers, deceased, for the purpose of computing inheritance tax. In such a case as this the facts
are necessarily all in the possession of the adverse
parties, namely, the two sons of the deceased who are
also the executors and sole heirs to her estate. None
of these facts are in the possession of the Tax Commission. Unless the power and duty to investigate those
facts are conceded as having been given to the Commission, and further, unless the general powers of subpoena granted in Section 80-5-46 are also made applicable to the investigation and collection of inheritance
taxes, it becomes obvious that the Tax Commission
is stripped of everything necessary to carry out its
statutory duties as collector and investigator of inheritance tax liability.
Petitioner argues that the general grants of power
eontained in Section 80-5-46 refer only to general property taxes. It is submitted that a fair reading of these provisions will demonstrate the error of this position.
Attention in this regard is again specifically directed
to Subsection (23) wherein the Tax Commission is enjoined ''to perform such further duties as may be
imposed upon it by law, and exercise all powers necessary in performance of its duties.'' Furthermore,
among others, Subsections (1), (2), (9), (16), (19)~ (20),
(22) and (24) of Section 80-5-46 do not refer to general
property taxes but refer· to exactly what the title of that
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section indicates they should refer to, namely, the general
powers and duties of the Tax Commission applying
equally to all taxes. Also it is impossible to conceive
how petitioner can argue that Section 80-5-37, which
refers to the number of commissioners, the term of
office, how they are to be appointed, their eligibility
and method of removal ; Section 80-5-38, which refers
to qualifications of persons appointed as Tax Commissioners, and further as to reappointment; Section
80-5-39, which refers to the oath of office and the
amount of bond to be given by each tax commissioner;
Section 80-5-40, which refers to the appointment of
a chairman, what shall constitute a quorum and when
sessions shall be held; Section 80-5-41, which refers
to the appointment of a secretary to the Tax Commission and the employment of other agents, etc. ; Section
80-5-42, which refers to the salaries, the terms of office
of employees, etc.; Section 80-5-43, which refers to the
place where the office of the Tax Commission shall be,
what equipment it shall have and the powers to establish branch offices; Section 80-5-44, which refers to
the seal and attestation of documents by the Tax Commission; and Section 80-5-45, which states the salaries
of the Commissioners, have any more reference to general property taxes than to any other tax law which
the Tax Commission administers. In fact, fairly and
impartially viewed, all the provisions of Chapter 5 of
Title 80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, refer solely
to the Tax Commission and not to any particular tax law
and outline and limit the duties .an? powers of the Tax
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Conllilission with reference to any matter coming within
its jurisdiction.

The Use by the Tax Commission of Its Subpoena
Power Does Not Infringe Upon Any Personal or
Constitutional Right of the Petitioner.
The grant of subpoena power to an administrative
agency such as the Tax Commission is constitutional.
This proposition is no longer open to dispute. Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 38 L.
Ed. 1047; Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U. S.
619, 69 L. Ed. 1119; Federal Mining, etc. Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, 26 Idaho 391, 143 Pac. 1173.
These same authorities establish also the rule that
while the subpoena power may. be granted to an administrative agency, that agency cannot be given the power
to punish by its own action contempt of such subpoena.
If a person properly subpoenaed by su.ch an agency
refuses to obey the subpoena, the question must be presented to a court where the person must be given an
opportunity for a hearing before he is held in contempt.
The punishment for the contempt must be meted out by
a judicial agency.
Our statutes contemplate exactly that procedure.
Section 104-45-15, provides that where a subpoena issued
by a non-judicial officer is not obeyed, that fact must
be reported to the District Court by such non-judicial
officer, and the court will proceed in accordance with
the statutory provisions to an adjudication of whether
a contempt has been committed.
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Petitioner, at Pages 10 to 15 of his brief, cites many
cases. It is not clear to us exactly upon what proposition
petitioner contends these cases to be authority. In fact,
we submit that the cases are either wholly immaterial
to the issues in the case at bar, or are authority for the
position urged by defendants. The only common thread
seemingly running through all these decisions cited by
petitioner is the proposition that inquiries cannot be
allowed to infringe upon constitutional guarantee of
freedom and privacy. With this proposition defendants
have no guarrel.
Let us, however, analyze the cases cited by petitioner:
In the case of In re Pacific Railroad Commission,
32 Fed. 241, the investigatory commission had subpoenaed Mr. Leland Stanford to appear before it and
testify with reference to certain matters. Mr. Stanford appeared in response to the subpoena, but during
the course of the examination, he refused to answer
certain questions which, he contended, had no bearing
upon the inquiries which the Commission was empowered
to make, and referred only to his personal and private
affairs. The Commission applied for an order of the
District Court to require Mr. Stanford to answer the
questions propounded. The District Court seemed, in
that case, to base its opinion, first, upon the proposition
that the Federal Judiciary could not constitutionally
be required to aid such an investigatory body by giving
force to its subpoena; and, second, that in any event, the
questions were not proper and were beyond the scope
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of the powers of investigation invested in the Commission, or in other words, went beyond the subject matter
which the Commission was entitled to investigate. The
decision is no longer law on the first proposition but
has been overruled so far as that ground of the opinion
goes by the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Brimson, supra. The Brimson case holds that the Federal Judiciary can be required by Congress to enforce
subpoenas of administrative agencies. The Pacific Railroad Commission case has been cited in subsequent cases
only for the proposition that where a witness who has
responded to a subpoena refuses to answer questions
upon the ground of constitutional guarantee, the court
to whom application is made to force the witness to answer will consider whether the questions are proper, and
if found to be too broad in their scope or if found to be
beyond the power of the agencies asking the question,
the· court will so decide and the witness will not be compelled to answer.
The case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
29 L. Ed. 746, involved a criminal prosecution for violation of duty laws. The law in question provided that the
person against whom the proceeding was had could be required to produce evidence necessary to convict him of
the offense, that if he did not produce the evidence in response to the subpoena of the Government, he would be
held to have admitted the allegations with reference to
which the evidence was sought to be produced. In this
case, at the trial, the Government subpoenaed the defendant to produce certain vouchers. T.he defenpant proquced
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the vouchers but objected to their admission into evidence
on the ground that the law requiring him to produce evidence against himself would violate both the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The court ruled
with the defendant in that case and held that in view of the
Fifth Amendment providing that ''no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself,'' the defendant could not be required to produce
evidence which would assist in convicting him of the offense charged.
In the case of In re Klein, 138 Misc. Rep. 282, 245
N. Y. S. 486, the permanent receiver did not follow the
statutory method set out for issuing a subpoena; namely,
that the receiver should apply to the court and upon good
cause shown, the court would issue the subpoena. The
receiver there attempted to issue the subpoena himself.
the court held that since the subpoena was not issued in
accordance with statute, it was of no force and effect.
Further ground for the holding was that the subpoena
had not, in any event, been signed by the receiver, and
that since the statute required that it be signed, it could
not possibly have any validity.
In the cases of Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Company, 264 U. S. 298, 68 L. Ed. 696;
Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S.
407, 53 L. Ed. 253; United States v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 236 U. S. 318, 59 L. Ed. 598; and Federal
Trade Commission v. P. Lorillard Company, 283 Fed.
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sponded to a subpoena of the Commission and who had
appeared and was testifying, but who refused to answer
a particular question on the grounds that it was beyond
the scope of the inquiry which the Commission was empowered to make, could be forced to answer the question. In each case, the court, after finding that the questions were not proper and were not related to matters
which the Commission had authority to inquire into, of
course held that the witness could not be required to
answer.
In the case of Ward Baking Company v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 205 App. Div. 723, 200 N. Y. S. 865, the"
court refused to enforce a subpoena issued by the At~
torney General on the ground that a criminal investigation, which the Attorney General was there attempting
to make, could be made under New York Law only by one
body, namely, the Grand Jury, and that since the Attorney General had no statutory or other authority to
make a criminal investigation, he had no subpoena power
in connection with such an attempted investigation.
In the Kilbourn v. Thompson case, 103 U. S. 168, 26
L. Ed. 377, the court held that since the investigation
which Congress was attempting to make was not related
to any proposed legislation, and since, further, it was
judicial in its nature, it was beyond the power of Congress and, therefore, the subpoena had no force and effect.

Contracts, 113
The case of In re Investigation of
.
Misc. 370, 184 N. Y. S. 518, upholds the subpoena power
'

'
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granted by the Legislature of the State of New York to
the Commission Counsel of Albany, but holds that since
the law granting the subpoena power gave that power
only to certain persons (namely, city officials) and with
reference to certain documents (documents of record), the
subpoena in question, which was issued to a private individual to produce his private records, was not within the
scope of the statute. The court further holds that even
if they interpreted the law to allow the subpoena to be
issued to the person and for the purposes for which it
was issued, nevertheless the subpoena in this case was
invalid because it was not signed by the president of
the Common Counsel of Albany as specifically required
by the law. ~
The case of In re Barnes, 204 N. Y. 108, 97 N. E. 508,
upholds the subpoena power, but the situation was the
same as in the Federal Trade Commission cases, namely,
that questions which were asked by the investigatory
body were held by the court to be not related to the subject which the body was empowered to investigate and,
hence, being too broad, the witness would not be required
to answer. It is to be noted, however, that there was
in that case a very vigorous dissent on the question of
whether the propounded inquiries were pertinent.
The cases of Go-Bart Importing Company v. United
States, 282 U. S. 344, 75 L. Ed. 374; Grau v. United
States, 287 U. S. 124, 77 L. Ed. 212; and Sgro v. United
States, 287 U. S. 206, 77 L. Ed. 260, all involved the same
situation. In each of these cases the defendant-appellant
had been charged with violation of the National
Prohi,
'
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bition . .\ct. In each case there had been an illegal search
and seizure \Yithout a valid search warrant or without
any search \Yarrant at all, by \vhich search and seizure
certain articles, which the Government attempted to use
in evidence, had been seized. When the Government offered the articles so seized in evidence, the defendant in
each case objected to the introduction of the evidence on
the grounds that it had been procured by an illegal search
and seizure in violation of the Constitution. In each
case the District Court had allowed the evidence to be
introduced over the objection, and the Supreme Court
reversed the cases on the grounds that such evidence
could not be introduced in a criminal proceeding.
We submit, therefore, that from the above analysis
of the cases cited by petitioner, it is demonstrated that
none of these cases has anything to do with the situation at bar.
One group of the cases deals with criminal matters
and the introduction of evidence in criminal proceedings, which evidence the defendant has been forced, in
one way or another, to give against himself. The proposition that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be required to testify or give evidence against himself is
unquestioned, but has no bearing on the situation at bar.
Others of the cases deal only with the proposition
that where the subpoena is not legally issued in accordance with statutory requirements, it is an invalid subpoena. Since no claim is made in the case at bar that the
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quirements are concerned, those cases have no materiality here.
The rest of the cases may generally be grouped as
holding that where a witness appears in response to a subpoena issued by an administrative body, he may refuse to
answer a question if the question goes beyond the scope of
the subject matter which the body is entitled to inquire into, or if the question would violate any constitutional guarantee of personal security and freedom. With this group
of cases we have no quarrel, and if material in the situation at bar, we submit that they are authority for affirming the action of the District Court in this case.
In the first instance, this latter group of cases cited
by petitioner all uphold the subpoena power when the
subpoena is issued by an administrative body in connection with matters which it has the statutory duty or
power to inquire into and investigate. Secondly, these
cases demonstrate that petitioner could not possibly be
placed at any disadvantage before the Tax Commission
in response to the subpoena issued because, should the
Tax Commission propound any inquiry to him or should
the Tax Commission require the production of any book
or record not relating to the inheritance tax liability of
the property located at 41-43 Broadway, petitioner would
be completely within his rights in refusing to answer such
a question or refusing to produce such record. If the
Tax Commission then felt that the question or record 'vas
pertinent to its inquiry with regard to inheritance tax
liability of that particular property, it could then petition the District Court for an order to show cause why
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the petitioner should not answer the inquiry or produce
the record. .:\. hearing Yrould then be had in the District
Court at which petitioner would be entitled to a hearing
and be given the opportunity to present his side of the
controversy and defend his refusal to answer or produce
the record. If the District Court ruled with the petitioner, the matter would be ended. If the District Court
ruled with the Tax Commission, the petitioner would be
required to answer or produce the record. In any event,
the petitioner "\Vould be fully and completely protected
from any unwarranted attempt to pry into his private
affairs not related to the question of whether the property at 41-4:3 Broadway should be subject to inheritance
tax.
We submit that petitioner should do exactly as the
complainants in the Federal Trade Commission v.
American Tobacco Company, supra, Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra, United States v.
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, supra, Federal Trade Commission v. P. Lorillard Co., supra, and In
re Barnes, supra, cases did, namely, appear in response
to the subpoena of the Tax Commission and then if the
Tax Commission attempts to pry into purely personal
matters not related to inheritance ,tax liability, refuse
to answer the questions or produce the records. He
would then have his day in court, would be completely
protected by a judicial hearing, and could not possibly
be hurt or placed at a disadvantage in any manner whatsoever. See also Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Brimson, supra.
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Therefore, when petitioner complains at Page 9 of
his brief that if he appeared before the Tax Commission
in response to the subpoena, confidential matters not related to the controversy might be revealed, petitioner is
making what we submit is a premature argument not
present in the controversy at this stage, since no questions have been propounded to petitioner and no confidential matters not related to the controversy have
been attempted to be elicited from petitioner.

The Petition of the Tax Commission Stated
a Good Cause of Action
At Pages 36 and 37 of his brief, petitioner argues
that his demurrer to the petition of the Tax Commission
should have been sustained because the petition did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The
reasons propounded by petitioner for this position are
that the Tax Commission did not allege that it had authority to investigate the inheritance tax liability of the
estate and that it did not allege either that the estate
owned the property or the value of it or that the property
is subject to inheritance tax.
Briefly answering these contentions, the defendants
call attention to the fact that the Tax Commission necessarily could not allege whether the property was subject to inheritance tax, nor whether the estate owned
the property. Those were the very things which the
Tax Commission was attempting to investigate. The
question of the value of the property and whether the
property is subject to inheritance tax were not· before
the Court in this pr;oceeding and were wholly inilnaterial
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to the question of \Yhether Alton R. ~layers "\Vas in contempt for refusing to obey the subpoena of the Tax Commission.
The District Court is bound to take judicial notice
of the statutes of the State of Utah. The authority to
investigate the inheritance tax liability of the estate of
Nellie R. Mayers is found in the specific provisions of
Section 80-12-37, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Allegations in the petition of the Tax Commission setting
forth the terms of that statutory provision would have
been superfluous and certainly were unnecessary.
Since the sole question before the District Court in
this proceeding was whether Alton R. Mayers was guilty
of contempt in failing to obey the subpoena issued by
the State Tax Commission, all matters with reference to
whether the estate should pay an inheritance tax on one
piece of property or another, the value of the property,
etc., would have been purely collateral matters which
could not properly be brought before the Court in this
proceeding. The facts alleged in the petition of the Tax
Commission are all the facts which are necessary to bring
before the Court the material, ultimate facts with reference to the problem before the Court: Had Alton R.
Mayers committed a contempt~

CONCLUSION
In summary, defendants maintain that the following
propositions have been successfully established:
First, petitioner has misconceived his procedural
remedy in this case. Prohibition will not lie i~ this matter
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and will not allow petitioner to test alleged error in the
judgment of the District Court. Therefore, the Alternative Writ of Prohibition already issued should be dismissed and the permanent writ prayed for should be
denied.
Second, defendants contend that the question of
whether the Tax Commission has the subpoena power is
not properly before the Court in this proceeding. Without
conceding the materiality of that question in this proceeding and without waiving defendants' position that
prohibition will not lie in the case at bar, defendants have
established that the Tax Commission has the subpoena
power in connection with its duly authorized and directed
investigation of inheritance tax liability.
Third, Alton R. Mayers refused to obey the legally
authorized and duly served subpoena of the Tax Commission. His only defense of his action was his argument
that the Tax Commission has not the subpoena power.
Having established the power of the Tax Commission
to issue the subpoena in question, the refusal of Alton
R. Mayers to obey the subpoena is a contempt under Section 104-45-15, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and the
judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON,
GRANT A. BROWN,
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR.

Attorneys for Defendants.
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